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FIFTH AMENDMENT-SEIZURE OF INCRIMINATING DOCUMENTS
Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976)
On June 29, 1976 the Supreme Court in Andresen
v. Maryland1 held that a warrant-authorized search
of an individual's offices for personal records, the
subsequent seizure of such records and their admis-
sion into evidence at trial did not offend the fifth
amendment proscription against compulsory self-
incrimination.'
The petitioner, David C. Andresen, acted as
attorney for a real estate settlement in two suburban
Maryland counties. The settlement was managed by
a development corporation of which Andresen was
the sole principal. Early in 1972, an investigation
was initiated to determine if Andresen had misrepre-
sented the quality of title that was to be conveyed
with the land.8 A search warrant was issued upon a
finding of probable cause by a judge of the Sixth
Judicial Circuit of Montgomery County, Maryland,
to search both of Andresen's offices. ' On appeal to
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, Andresen
was to challenge the specificity of each warrant, but
that court would hold the warrants to be sufficiently
specific. 8',he searches were executed during the day
of October 31, 1972. Andresen, and later his counsel,
was present during the search of his law office. A
196 S.Ct. 2737 (1976).
2U. S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . ; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
'The investigation was conducted by a "Bi-County
Fraud Unit," acting under the jurisdiction of the State's
Attorney's offices for both Montgomery and Prince
George's Counties, Maryland. The Fraud Unit's investiga-
tion "included interviews with the purchaser, mortage-
holder, and other lien-holders of Lot 13T, as well as an
examination of County land records." 96 S.Ct. at 2741.
'Petitioner maintained both a law office and a separate
office housing the Mount Vernon Development Corpora-
tion. Andresen was incorporator, sole shareholder, resident
agent and director of this corporate entity.
'24 Md. App. 128, 331 A. 2d 78 (1975). The warrants
requested a long list of specific documents. All the items
pertained to Lot 13T. The basis for Andresen's specificity
challenge arose out of the inclusion at the end of each
warrant of the following language:
... together with other fruits, instrumentalities,
and evidence of crime at this time unknown.
96 S.Ct. at 2748-49 n.10. The Court of Special Appeals
simultaneous search at Andresen's Mount Vernon
Development Corporation was conducted in his
absence. The search resulted in the seizure of 3% of
his law office files and 5% of the development
corporation files. 8
It is established in case law that a corporate entity
may not invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. But despite the circumstances in which
Andresen's papers were seized, the Supreme Court
noted that there had been no finding that any of the
papers were corporate papers. 'For private papers, a
privilege against self-incrimination exists and has
been successfully invoked. ' After a full suppression
hearing by the trial court, the net result (after many
of the files had been voluntarily returned by the
State's Attorney) was the retention of only one
development corporation file. Seven of the twenty-
eight law office files were returned to Andresen, and
four additional files were suppressed for lack of
relevancy to the offense. The remaining items were
admitted into evidence over the objection that such
admission was violative of the fourth and fifth
amendments. 50
of Maryland found that this language was to be taken in the
context of the preceding list of items sought in relation to
13T, and authorized a search and seizure of unknown
evidence only as to the crime of false pretenses concerning
that lot. 24 Md. App. at 167, 331 A. 2d at 103 (1975).
696 S.Ct. at 2741-42.
'Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88-89 (1974);
Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
896 S.Ct. at 2742 n.2. It is interesting to note that the
determination of the Court that the papers seized were of a
personal and not corporate nature was placed in a footnote
to the decision, despite its clear relevance to the fifth
amendment question.
9Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S 43,76 (1906). In both Gouledand
Hale, petitioners sought to have private papers protected by
the Court. In Gouled, petitioner successfully challenged
his fraud conviction; in Hale, petitioner succeeded in his
habeas corpus petition after incarceration for failure to
produce subpoenaed documents.
"°U. S. CONST. amend IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Vol. 67, No. 4
Printed in US.A.
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At trial, the State relied only to a small extent on
the challenged evidence, turning insteadt to the
testimony and documents of the various victims and
to public records. Three development corporation
documents and five documents from Andresen's law
office were ultimately admitted into evidence. Of
these eight documents, some were in Andresen's own
handwriting. 1 Petitioner was convicted in a trial by
jury of five counts of false pretenses and three counts
of fraudulent misappropriation by a fiduciary. He
was sentenced to eight concurrent two-year terms in
the state penitentiary. "2
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland subse-
quently reversed on four of the five counts of false
pretenses, holding that the State's Attorney had
failed to allege the requisite intent to defraud. The
court sustained the conviction on the other counts,
however, rejecting Andresen's claim that admission
of the documents seized in the searches of his two
offices had violated his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The court held that since
the State had seized the documents, authenticating
them by other means, it had compelled nothing of
Andresen and so no fifth amendment claim could be
sustained. 13 Essential to this reasoning was the
distinction drawn between a search warrant and a
subpoena. The former is a method of obtaining
evidence by the actions of State agents. The applica-
tion for a warrant is a one-party proceeding. The
search itself is carried out by State agents, often in
the absence of other parties. A subpoena, on the
other hand, is a court order directing an individual to
himself bring evidence forward to the court. It was on
this distinction that Andresen's fifth amendment
claim was rejected, and on this ruling that Andresen
applied for certiorari. Certiorari was granted limited
to the fourth and fifth amendment issues involved. 1
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
For text of U.S. CONST. amend. V, see note 2 supra.
"The documents seized from the Mount Vernon Devel-
opment Corp. were prepared by a clerk who did title
searches for petitioner. The documents concerned deeds of
trust impacting on parts of the housing subdivision Andres-
en was overseeing. Of the law office documents seized, most
dealt with lot 13T. Only one was in the handwriting of
Andresen himself. 96 S.Ct. at 2742.
"2 The three counts of fraudulent misappropriation by a
fiduciary arose out of the transfer of funds to Andresen by
three purchasers. The transfer was made so that Andresen
would obtain clear title to the land, and he received the
funds on his assurance that he would do so.
1324 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975).
"423 U.S. 822 (1975).
The Fifth Amendment Claim
The substance of the Supreme Court's reasoning
was in agreement with the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland. In deciding whether the petitioner had
a legitimate fifth amendment claim, the focus of the
Court was on the method of producing the evidence.
Since the State had produced the evidence itself, the
petitioner had not been compelled to do anything,
and thus deserved no fifth amendment privilege. "
The construction the Court placed on the fifth
amendment was clearly a limited one in that the
word "compelled" was taken in a narrow sense. In
attempting to put the fifth amendment in historical
perspective, the Court began by tracing the privilege
back to inquisitorial systems of investigation and the
English Star Chamber. In the majority's view, the
fifth amendment was a response on the part of the
Framers to oppressive governments which "placed a
premium on compelling subjects of the investigation
to admit guilt from their own lips." 6
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented in Andresen, not-
ing that the verb compel can mean much more:
The matter cannot be resolved on any simplistic
notion of compulsion. Search and seizure is as rife with
elements of compulsion as subpoena. The intrusion
occurs under the lawful process of the State. The
individual is not free to resist that authority. "
It is clear that the evidence seized from Andresen
was both communicative and testimonial, and thus
"In discussing why the fifth amendment did not apply
in the instant case, the Court drew an analogy to a second
recent case in this area. Couch-v. United States, 409 U.S.
322 (1973), involved a subpoena directed at petitioner's
accountant to obtain tax records. The Couch Court felt that
there was no action called for on the part of petitioner and
so the privilige against self-incrimination was inappropri-
ate. After citing Couch, the Andresen Court reasoned as
follows:
Similarly, in this case, petitioner was not asked to
say or do anything. The records seized contained
statements that petitioner had voluntarily committed
to writing. The search and seizure of these records
were conducted by law enforcement personnel. Fi-
nally, when these records were introduced at trial,
they were authenticated by a handwriting expert, not
petitioner. Any compulsion of petitioner to speak,
other than the inherent psychological pressure to
respond at trial to unfavorable evidence was not
present.
vo S.Ct. at 2745.
1696 S.Ct. at 2743, quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 440 (1974).
1796 S.Ct. at 2751. Justice Brennan saw no distinction




potentially protected by the fifth amendment. That
is, the evidence was obtained for its testimonial
content, rather than any physical characteristics it
might possess. In this respect it is distinguishable
from the evidence seized in Warden v. Hayden, "an
opinion authored by Mr. Justice Brennan only nine
years before his dissent in Andresen. In Hayden, the
Court considered both a fourth and a fifth amend-
ment claim concerning the admissibility of clothing
seized by police while in hot pursuit 'of an armed
robber. There the Court rejected the fifth amend-
ment's application because the evidence seized was
merely physical evidence."
Part of the justification for the result in Andresen
was the Court's concern that a contrary result would
undermine the holding in United States v. Marron.
20
This concern seems unfounded when considered in
light of the completely different focus of the law of
search and seizure in Marron, a pre-Hayden deci-
sion decided under the mere evidence rule, 21 which
had controlled the law of search warrants under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 22 Factually,
Marron is similar to Andresen on its face, each
involving the seizure of private papers. However, in
Marron the papers seized were the ledger, receipts,
and accounts receivable of an illegal speakeasy,
seized to aid a prosecution under the eighteenth
amendment . 2' These papers were held to be
1-3 87 U.S. 294 (1967).
iSId. at 300-01,
2-275 U.S. 192 (1927). The Marron Court concerned
itself not with the manner of production, as in Andresen,
but with the nature of the evidence sought, as the mere
evidence rule commanded.2'The Hayden Court overturned the mere evidence rule
when it felt a contrary course would compel them to reverse
Hayden's conviction under the rule, set out in note 27,
infra.22
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b):
Grounds for issuance. A Warrant may he issued
under the rule to search for and seize any property
(1) stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the
United States; or
(2) designed or intended for use or which is or has
been used as the means of committing a crimi-
nal offense; or
(3) possessed, controlled or designed or intended for
use or which is or has been used in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 957 (Dec. 27, 1948).
18 U.S.C. § 957, entitled "Possession of property in aid of
a foreign government," had no bearing on any of the cases
cited herein except Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 717
(1960).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII.
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating
instrumentalities of crime, and as such the legitimate
object of a search under the fourth amendment. 24
While this conclusion may be questioned, it served as
the articulated basis for sustaining Marron's convic-
tion, and no similar characterization was made by
the Andresen Court so as to call the Marron decision
into question.
While the Marron Court allowed the admissibility
of papers perhaps conceptually similar to the papers
Andresen possessed, it did so for reasons entirely
unrelated to the reasons articulated in Andresen.
Marron had no possessory interest in the papers
since they had been deemed by the Court to be in-
strumentalities of the crime and so fit the category
of something superior to "mere evidence". The
Andresen Court had no such convenient category for
Andresen's papers.
The Andresen opinion confusingly cites Abel v.
United States25 as supporting its conclusion. In
Abel, as in Marron, the facts are somewhat anala-
gous, but the law is clearly not. Here petitioner had
attempted to discard a cipher notebook and microfilm
during his arrest by federal agents. After he had
checked out of his room with the arresting officers,
the items were seized by government agents as
abandoned property. As such, they could not support
a fourth or fifth amendment challenge to their
admissibility. As to the question of private papers
generally, the Abel Court noted:
We have held in this regard that not every item may
be seized which is properly inspectible by the Govern-
ment in the course of a valid search; for example,
private papers desired by the government merely for
use as evidence may not be seized, no matter how
lawful the search which discovers them. 26
Additionally, the cipher book and microfilm would
both have qualified as fruits or instrumentalities of
the crime had they not been abandoned.
The Andresen Court expressed the fear that to
liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all
territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for bever-
age purposes is hereby prohibited.
2 The Court stated:
The closet in which the liquor and the ledger
were found was used as a part of the saloon . And if
the ledger were not as essential to the maintenance
of the establishment as were bottles, liquor, and
glasses, it was none the less a part of the outfit or
equipment actually used to commit the offense.
275 U.S. at 199.
2i362 U.S. 217 (1960).
281d. at 234-35.
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hold Andresen's papers inadmissible by way of the
fifth amendment would exclude evidence "tradition-
ally" admissible; for example, ransom notes or
bookie sheets. 27 This suggestion is difficult to
fathom. Would this evidence have been traditionally
admissible under the mere evidence rule? Perhaps
the Court meant only evidence "traditionally" ad-
missible since the 1967 Hayden decision. In any
event, if, according to the Andresen decision, the
fourth amendment reasonableness of a search and
seizure is not based on any hard and fast rule, but
rather on a case by case analysis, with a considera-
tion of the private nature of the items to be seized, it
would seem that a contrary result in Andresen need
not lead to the exclusion of such evidence as a ran-
som note or a bookie sheet. Assuming arguendo
that ransom notes, bookie sheets, and Andresen's
personal memoranda and documents are all one
conceptually, still the manner of seizure varies
widely. Ransom notes are normally turned over to
the authorities by the relatives or other parties close
to the victim. This is hardly fertile ground for a fifth
amendment challenge. Bookie sheets are normally
incidental targets of a search and seizure, discovered
in the pursuit of some contraband, such as policy
slips. In Andresen, the papers and documents were
the only target of the authorities. Nor is it a foregone
conclusion that the three types of evidence above are
totally similar. In representing the thoughts of peti-
tioner rather than serving a mere bookkeeping func-
tion, it could be argued that Andresen's papers are
conceptually different from a ledger or bookie sheet.
The point is simply that a principled distinction
could have been drawn had the Court been so in-
clined.
Andresen has clearly simplified the law of search
and seizure as well as the doctrine of self-incrimina-
tion. Absent compulsion in the most simplistic sense,
no evidence can be challenged as self-incriminatory,
regardless of its content and author. There can be no
claim of self-incrimination on the basis of items
seized from third parties. 2 8Nor can the privilege be
invoked if the items are seized rather than obtained
by process of subpoena duces tecum. The result, as
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, will be to
encourage the government to obtain a warrant for
documents which could not be obtained by other
2796 S.Ct. at 2745-46.
28Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
process, and to render the fifth amendment impotent
in such instances:
I can perceive no distinction of meaningful substance
between compelling the production of such records
through subpoena and seizing such records against the
will of the petitioner. 29
Unreasonable Search Under the Mere Evidence Rule
While Andresen comports with the most recent
decisions in this area, the earlier decisions on the
interplay of the self-incrimination privilege and what
constituted a "reasonable" search and seizure were
of a distinctly different flavor. A pre-constitutional
example is found in the case of Entick v. Carring-
ton. " The opinion dealt with search and seizure of
private papers under a general warrant. In condem-
ning the seizure of private papers, Lord Camden"
spoke of their special significance:
Papers are the owner's goods and chattel; they are
his dearest property, and are so far from enduring a
seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and
though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty
of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed
and carried away the secret nature of those goods will
be an aggravation of the trespass. "2
The case law as it developed in this century gave
no automatic privilege to the private papers of an
individual. Rather, it allowed search and seizure of
items in a private office or residence only where the
State or a third party had a property claim superior
to that of the suspect in possession. Thus in Boyd v.
United States, " a statute 4 was held to be unconsti-
tutional which offered a choice between production of
subpoenaed documents and a confession to the
charges. Boyd is clearly distinguishable from Andres-
en in that a subpoena had been employed, thereby
forcing Boyd to bring forward the evidence himself.
But the distinction which was seized upon by the
Andresen Court, that between a subpoena, where the
defendant is compelled to bring the documents into
court, and a search warrant, where the target of the
search merely must passively submit, was not recog-
nized by the Boyd Court. Boyd contained some broad
2996 S.Ct. at 2750.
'019 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
"Lord Camden (1713-94) was Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas.
" Quoted in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628-9
(1886).
33Id.
3"Act of June 22, 1874.
[Vol. 67
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dictum concerning the scope of the fourth and fifth
amendments and what the court viewed as an
insignificant distinction between the two methods of
obtaining evidence:
[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of
a man's private books and papers to be used in evi-
dence against him is substantially different from com-
pelling him to be a witness against himself. "
Both Boyd and the earlier Entick decision were
concerned with coercive governmental measures and
seemed to foreshadow the contemporary right to
privacy. The Court in Andresen acknowledged that
there may be some overlap of the fifth amendment
and a right of privacy, but denied that the right of
privacy absent governmental compulsion is sufficient
to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. "
Hale v. Henkel" involved a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to challenge a contempt order issued for re-
fusal to obey a subpoena duces tecum. The Hale
Court, following Boyd, stated that it saw no real
difference between compulsion by subpoena and a
forcible search and seizure by the state, suggesting
that any forced production of books and papers
may constitute an "unreasonable" search and
seizure. " In Abel v. United States, " the Court
noted that the rule still operated in controlling
search and seizure:
[Pirivate papers desired by the Government merely
for use as evidence may not be seized no matter how
lawful the search which discovers them. "
The mere evidence rule, allowing only fruits and
instrumentalities but not "mere evidence" of crime
to be acceptable objects of a search, was the control-
ling theme in judging the reasonableness of search
"11.6 U.S. at 633.
"696 S.Ct. at 2747.
37201 U.S. 43 (1906).
"'In part the Hale Court stated:
We are also of the opinion that an order for the pro-
duction of books and papers may constitute an un-
reasonable search and seizure within the Fourth
Amendment. While a search ordinarily implies a
quest by an officer of the law, and a seizure contem-
plates a forcible dispossession of the owner, still, as
was held in the Boyd case, the substance of the of-
fense is the compulsory production of private papers,
whether under a search warrant or a subpoena duces
tecum, against which the person... is entitled to
protection.
201 U.S. at 76.
"9362 U.S. 217 (1960).
"Id. at 234-35.
and seizure. It was adopted by Congress into the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. '* Boyd had
clearly placed emphasis on the nature of the evidence
sought, not the manner of its production. The requi-
site superior property claim of the government could
be found in contraband, in the instrumentalities or
the fruits of the crime, but not in "mere evidence."
The mere evidence rule operated apart from the di-
rect influence of the fifth amendment. Despite un-
certainties in application, the rule served to protect
citizens from "fishing" expeditions, or from the
prosecutor's too great reliance on search and seizure
to obtain damning evidence. While the mere evi-
dence rule seemed like an arbitrary line to many, it
nontheless provided some restraint on law enforce-
ment personnel. The distinction which the rule rein-
forced was that of property rights, 42 and while this
perhaps reflected the Framer's view of the role of the
fourth amendment, it served in more recent times to
force courts either to expand the interpretation of
fruits and instrumentalities or to deny evidence to
finders of fact. It provided a zone of privacy into
which officers armed with a warrant could not ven-
ture. The mere evidence rule protected a citizen's
rights under both the fourth and fifth amendments,
deeming unreasonable a search and seizure of per-
sonal effects and papers without a legitimate prop-
erty right.
The mere evidence rule was abandoned in Warden
v. Hayden, 4' where the Court declined to apply the
rule to exclude clothing of the defendant seized by
officers in hot pursuit after an armed robbery. "'
The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice
Brennan, a dissenter in Andresen. In Hayden the
Court recognized the expansion of the scope of search
warrants that the decision might provoke, but felt
that supervision by a magistrate would provide
adequate safeguards during the determination of
probable cause. Since the magistrate is in a good
position to judge the specificity of the warrant on a
case by case basis, the artificial distinction drawn by
the mere evidence rule could safely be dispensed
"See note 27 supra.
"The mere evidence rule viewed the fourth amendment
reasonableness of a search as hinging on whether the State
had a superior property interest in the subject of the search
and seizure. Thus fruits or instrumentalities of crime either
belonged to the State as contraband or to a third party
whose property had been purloined, and for whom the State
could intervene.
4387 U.S. 294 (1967).
"Id. at 301-02.
1976]
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with. The Hayden Court denied that its holding
would encroach on a right to privacy:
Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to
a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search
directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband. A
magistrate can intervene in both situations, and the
requirement of probable cause and specificity can be
preserved intact. "
There seems to be no question that the Andresen
decision is in agreement with the earlier Hayden
decision. Whether mere evidence had originally been
recognized as the interplay of the fourth and fifth
amendments, a privacy right, or simply a fluke of
American law, the Hayden decision created a new
basis for granting a search warrant: probable cause
to believe that evidence of a crime would be found.
Unreasonable Seizure Due to the Nature of the
Evidence
Andresen also addressed a question which the
Hayden Court had explicitly left open. Following the
rejection of the mere evidence rule as the operative
test of "reasonableness," the Hayden Court noted
that the right of privacy might provide an ultimate
check on the scope of evidence which is reasonably
seizable:
This case does not require that we consider whether
there are items of evidential value whose very nature
precludes them from being the object of a reasonable
search and seizure. 46
Comparing its holding with earlier case law,
epitomized by Gouled v. United States, 47 the Hayden
Court felt that modern search and seizure was far
more concerned with privacy than property rights. 8
The fact situation in Hayden did not provide an
adequate test ground for the right of privacy, and the
Hayden opinion accordingly left open the possibility
45Id.
46Id. at 303.
"255 U.S. 298 (1921). Gouled involved the obtaining of
a search warrant to investigate a suspected fraud ring. The
Court disallowed the admission of seized documents on the
ground that the object of the search did not justify the
warrant, being "mere evidence". The Court viewed the
problem as follows:
[Slearch warrants... may not be used as a means
of gaining access to a man's house and papers solely
for the purpose of making search to secure evidence
to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceed-
ing.
255 U.S. at 309.
4 387 U.S. at 304.
of a later distinction based on the nature of the
evidence sought.
The facts of Hayden provided a wide range of
potential distinctions. For one, the search and seizure
took place while in hot pursuit after an armed
robbery. As such it constituted an exigency search
without the benefit of prior judicial scrutiny. The
primary target of the search, the gun and money,
were both illegally held by the defendant and so
not the legitimate basis of a privacy claim. The real
controversy in Hayden cantered around clothing
seized from a washing machine. It is well established
that such evidence is not entitled to fifth amendment
protection, since clothing is neither communicative
nor testimonial. "' Nor could the clothes fall under
some special protection through the sanctity of the
home. " Such evidence could even be subpoenaed
without offending the fifth amendment. "
Andresen, on the other hand, involved testimonial
and communicative evidence whose seizure had been
previously approved by a judge. As private papers
and documents, the fact situation in Andresen prom-
ised to shape the ultimate answer to the question left
open in Hayden. Given probable cause, and absent
any compulsion to bring forward evidence by sub-
poena or summons that would conflict with the fifth
amendment, is there any category of items whose
very nature would preclude a "reasonable" search
and seizure within the dictate of the fourth amend-
ment? The Court avoided the question in United
"See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
This decision held that a forced blood test administered to a
driver involved in a collision to determine intoxication did
not offend the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination since the evidence sought was merely physical
and not communicative or testimonial.
"See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965). The Griswold Court felt that a Connecticut statute
limiting the use of contraceptives encroached on a funda-
mental right of privacy.
"1 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973);
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
Dionisio was a putative defendant subpoenaed by a
grand jury to provide a voice exemplar. Dionisio
successfully invoked the fifth amendment on appeal, but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the voice exemplar
was to be used for identification purposes only, and not for
communicative or testimonal content.
Mara was in a similar situation, except here a handwrit-
ing sample had been requested. In holding against Mara,
the Court spoke of privacy:
[H]andwriting, like speech, is repeatedly shown to
the public, and there is no more expectation of privacy
in the physical characteristics of a person's script than




States v. Miller, 62 decided two months before
Andresen, by relying upon the property distinction:
On their face the documents subpoenaed here are
not respondent's "private papers." Unlike the claim-
ant in Boyd, respondent can assert neither ownership
nor possession. "
Here, authorized by the Bank Secrecy Act, " a sub-
poena had issued for bank records which concerned
Miller.
Fisher v. United States5 avoided a fifth amend-
ment claim provoked by a subpoena of petitioner's
tax records. Here the subpoena had been directed to
Mr. Fisher's attorney, who was holding the records.
Focusing on the fact that Fisher himself had not been
subpoenaed, the Court rejected any notion of a
transitive fifth amendment privilege invoked through
a third party, even through the attorney-client
privilege:
The taxpayer's Fifth Amendment privilege is there-
fore not violated by enforcement of the summonses
directed toward their attorneys. This is true whether
or not the Amendment would have barred a subpoena
directing the taxpayer to produce the documents while
they were in his hands. 6
In Fisher, as in Miller, the Court spoke of a pri-
vacy interest served by the fifth amendment, but
only within the narrow confines of the literal
wording of that amendment. Contrary to earlier
dicta, "'the Fisher Court found that the fifth amend-
ment did not accentuate the more general right of
privacy protected by the fourth amendment. 8
Andresen addressed the questions left open in
Hayden, and put aside in both Fisher and Miller:
Does the fifth amendment require exclusion of
evidence obtained by search and seizure which the
government could not properly have obtained by
subpoena? In considering the question, the Circuit
Courts of Appeal had generally come down on the
side of admissibility, " with at least one notable
52425 U.S. 435 (1976).
"Id. at 440.
"12 U.S.C. § 1892b(d) (1970).
-"425 U.S. at 391.
"Id. at 397. It is interesting to note that the court is still
trying to distinguish Boyd. See also Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
"In respect to earlier pronouncements of a substantial
overlap between the fourth and fifth amendments, see
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 767; Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
58425 U.S. at 399.
"Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1975);
exception. " The Andresen Court, per Mr. Justice
Blackmun, agreed with the majority view among the
circuits that no fifth amendment claim could bar the
admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to a valid
search warrant. None of the circuit court holdings
treated the Hayden question concerning items whose
very nature might make a search and seizure unrea-
sonable. If the case-by-case restraint the Hayden
Court foresaw as replacing a strict exclusion of mere
evidence exists at all, it has failed explictly to surface
thus far.
It is this point which is most elusive in the
Andresen decision. The opinion fails to give any
guidelines as to what objects might not be properly
subject to a search and seizure even without a fifth
amendment claim to bar the evidence. The Court
does not here expand upon Griswold v. Connecti-
cut., "' and Stanley v. Georgia, 62 which found the
home (and more specifically the bedroom) a special
zone or privacy, protecting from governmental sei-
zure even material which is contraband. It is certain
that the home, as opposed to an office, has greater
protection than a business office, but the Andresen
decision never discussed this distinction. Instead, the
Court adopted the view that the method of obtaining
the evidence, by search warrant instead of subpoena,
was the critical distinction in denying Andresen's
claim.
The uncertainty left by Hayden concerning possi-
ble protection for certain types of evidence has served
to increase the scope of potentially seizable evidence
and, consequently, to reduce a "zone" of privacy for
citizens. Prior to Hayden, the mere evidence rule
served to put an absolute limit on the type of evidence
that could be so obtained. It offered an effective, if
United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1973);
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cert. denied 405 U.S. 919 (1972).
6 0Hill v. Philpott, 455 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 991 (1971).
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The
Griswold decision is significant in that it recognized the
privacy and autonomy of the marital relationship as barring
a possible search of the bedroom in order to enforce a ban
on contraceptives. It is precisely this notion of an object
whose intimate nature precludei it'from being the target of
a "reasonable" search and seizure which Hayden sug-
gested.
6 2Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Here the
Court found improper the application of a pornography
statute to materials found in petitioner's bedroom after
discovery by means of a search warrant.
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imperfect, barrier to oppressive governmental tech-
niques of investigation. Search and seizure is an
invasion of privacy in the common sense of the word,
if not always in the legal sense. The cases following
Hayden have failed to point to any specific examples
of unseizable items and have given no direction to
magistrates issuing warrants, no doubt leading to an
expanding use of the warrant. Warrant applications
are one party proceedings, the only advocate being
the prosecutor. The judge is therefore likely to err on
the part of the State. The failure of the Andresen
Court to articulate guidelines for a principled consid-
eration of the reasonableness of a search and seizure
of particular items impinges on the right to privacy.
Conclusion
Andresen v. Maryland represents the current
Supreme Court stance on search and seizure and the
scope of the fifth amendment in that area. Insisting
on a strict definition of the fifth amendment, the
Court has erected a very strong distinction between
subpoena and search and seizure where formerly
there had been little or none. The holding was based
on the notion that since the defendant has not
physically brought the evidence forward by court
order, as opposed to seizure by the State, there has
been no compulsion in the fifth amendment sense. In
so holding the Court has probably encouraged the
use of the search warrant for investigation of white
collar crimes, including Internal Revenue Service
investigations. While the Court has attempted to
reconcile the instant decision with earlier case law, it
has met with limited success. The reason is simply
that such case law was based on the mere evidenc
rule, focusing on the nature of the property interest
in the evidence sought, rather than on the individ-
ual's right of privacy.
Andresen leaves open the perplexing question of
whether there is any kind of evidence which, because
of its intimate nature, would be immune from search
and seizure, regardless of its location. It is likely that
further attempts to put some limits on the permissi-
ble target of a search warrant will center around
what the Court has deemed the right of privacy.
Andresen, having involved an office rather than a
home, and business papers rather than some more
intimate possession, does leave some room for the
Court to maneuver. It appears, however, that
Andresen has contracted the area of potential protec-
tion from search and seizure.
